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Abstract 
Voluntary “donations” versus reward-oriented “contributions”: Two 
experiments on framing in funding mechanisms* 
 
 
In an artefactual field experiment we implement a crowdfunding campaign for a 
club good—an institute’s summer party with free food, drinks, and music—and 
compare “donation” and “contribution” framings. We find that the “donation” 
frame generates higher income than the “contribution” frame. While individuals 
in the “donation” frame give substantially larger amounts, the individuals in the 
“contribution” frame respond more strongly to reward thresholds and sugges-
tions. An additional survey experiment on M-Turk indicates that the term “dona-
tion” triggers more positive emotional responses, and that emotions are highly 
correlated with giving. It appears that making a “donation” is perceived as a more 
voluntary act and is, thus, more successful at generating warm glow than making 
a “contribution”. We conjecture that this extends to other funding mechanisms. 
 
 
Keywords: Crowdfunding, field experiment, framing, suggestions 
 
JEL classifications: C93, D64, D12. 
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1 Introduction 
Charitable giving, public good provision, and crowdfunding have all one thing in common: agents 
give money to finance a non-private good. The main difference between the three lies in the nature 
of the good for which money is collected. The beneficiaries of charitable giving are typically other 
people, the beneficiaries of public goods are, by definition, everybody, while the beneficiaries of 
most crowdfunding campaigns are the contributors. Both, charitable giving and public good 
provision mechanisms do typically not involve rewards for donors while crowdfunding campaigns 
have often nested reward schemes for different contributions.1  
Regardless of the identity of the beneficiaries of a funding mechanism the question arises how to 
describe the act of giving money to potential contributors. In public good games it appears common 
to refer to money that is given as a “contribution” while in charitable giving settings money that is 
given is mostly called a “donation”. In this paper we explore whether this choice of wording matters 
for behavior. While we do this in the context of a crowdfunding campaign, we believe that our 
results do also have implications for other funding mechanisms. 
Specifically, we implemented a crowdfunding campaign2 to finance an institute’s yearly summer 
party with free food, drinks, and music. The party normally attracts more than 150 participants. In 
previous years, a “donation box” had been placed in a prominent location during the party which 
frequently led to a shortfall of money. This time, around 20 days in advance, a crowdfunding 
campaign was announced in personalized emails. The campaign offered a multitude of incentives 
that were equal for all email recipients in order to increase participation: rewards like vouchers for 
tournaments and games and matching for early gifts. There were also numerous reminders.  
                                                          
1 These differences are, of courses, very much stylized and, in reality, there are many hybrid forms to be found. For 
example, charitable giving that benefits others, may benefit everybody if everybody cares about the benefit that is 
generated for others. Also, sometimes charities do offer (small) rewards for donations (see, for example Falk 2007) 
and many offer some form of social recognition as a reward (see, for example, Glazer and Konrad 1996). 
2 Crowdfunding has become a popular tool to raise money for projects attracting investments of $25 billion in 2015 
alone (Massolution 2015). Successfully funded projects include movies, video games, software, and electronic 
appliances but also charitable projects, scientific research for rare genetic diseases, or museum projects. One of the 
most successful projects so far has been the video game “Star Citizen” which surpassed $288 million in contributions 
in 2019 (https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattperez/2019/05/01/exclusive-the-saga-of-star-citizen-a-video-game-that-
raised-300-millionbut-may-never-be-ready-to-play/#5819cd155ac9, retrieved on 9 April 2020). But there are also 
many campaigns for small projects; notably for the arts and for local purposes. In Europe, the volume of donation-
based crowdfunding has grown between 2015 and 2017 from €22 to €53 million (Ziegler et al. 2019, p.33). 
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We implemented a subtle treatment manipulation in the wording of our emails, referring either to 
“donations” or “contributions.” In order to learn more about the mechanism driving giving behavior 
under the different mechanism, we also varied non-binding suggestions that were either €10 or €20 
along the second dimension of a 2x2 design. Additionally, we studied the responsiveness to other 
incentives offered (without experimental variation) depending on the frame. Specifically, we 
analyzed gift levels relative to the reward thresholds, and self-selection with respect to the timing 
of gifts: early gifts that were matched with a fixed amount offered by an anonymous sponsor versus 
late gifts that were not matched. 
While the term “donation” has a clear meaning that alludes to charitable giving, “contribution” has 
multiple meanings including some that are more related to duties. In Appendix A, Figure A3, we 
present word association maps that show different meanings and their connections. They suggest 
that the act of “donating” is more self-oriented while “contributing” invokes a notion of joint 
participation. On Google Trends, search terms that are combined with the word “donation” mostly 
relate to charitable giving (blood, organ, plasma, goodwill, salvation army, red cross, clothing) 
while those that are combined with “contribution” mostly relate to individual accounts, savings or 
insurances, and ask questions about the regulation of these, see the lists in the Appendix A, Table 
A4. The search term “donation” is approximately 20% more common than “contribution” and 
“charitable donation” is 71% more frequent than “charitable contribution” in Google searches.3 
Relatedly, in the literature on charitable giving, Andreoni (1995) documented that framing the same 
task as implying a positive externality rather than a negative externality generates more giving. 
This result has been replicated several times by, among others, Sonnemans, Schram, and Offerman 
(1998) and Park (2000). This line of research concludes that positive frames are more successful 
at stimulating warm glow than negative frames.  
Considering the above, we expect that the more unique meaning of the term “donation” and its 
connotation with voluntary charitable giving will increase giving through the intensification of 
warm glow when compared to the term “contribution.”  Given the different connotations, we also 
expect that gifts in the “contribution” frame will be more responsive to suggestions and rewards 
than in the “donation” frame.   
                                                          
3 Google Trends: Worldwide searches for 2004-2017. The difference is 65% in the first case and only 36% in the 
second case when looking at the US only. 
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We summarize our considerations in the following hypotheses: 
1. We expect that the “donation” frame will lead to higher gift levels than the “contribution” 
frame.  
2. We expect that the “donation” frame will lead to a higher share of individuals choosing gift 
levels over and above the reward thresholds.  
3. We expect individuals in the “contribution” frame to be more responsive to suggestions and 
hypothesize that the distance between chosen gifts and suggested amounts will be smaller 
in the “contribution” than in the “donation” frame.  
We will document supportive evidence for all three hypotheses. 
In order to further investigate the reasons for our treatment effects, we conducted an additional 
survey experiment on M-Turk where we measured emotional responses to the two frames. In line 
with our conjecture we show more positive emotional responses to the “donation” frame and also 
show that emotional responses are correlated with behavior in a public good game—highlighting 
that the main result from our field experiment extends beyond the crowdfunding setting. 
 
2 Design of the crowdfunding campaign 
Each year one of the departments of the research institute is responsible for the organization of a 
summer party. The fields represented at the institute include sociology, political science, law, and 
economics.4 In 2016, the department of economics was responsible for the organization and 
financing of the summer party. As usual, almost 550 employees, guests, and affiliated researchers 
were invited. Around half is employed as researchers (including PhD candidates and student RAs), 
one quarter is in administration, and the final quarter is made up of guests, affiliated researchers, 
alumni and friends.   
Instead of employing a donation box, which in previous years had regularly led to shortfalls in the 
financing, this time the invitation email announced a crowdfunding campaign to take place before 
the summer party. More specifically, there were four different versions of emails that were sent out 
                                                          
4 Economics made less than 10% of the staff in the experiment. 
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20 days before the party. A 2x2 design involved one treatment pair with a variation in wording and 
one pair with two different suggestions regarding the gift amounts. The email recipients were asked 
to “contribute” or to “donate” money or pledge a buffet “contribution” or “donation” for the party. 
In addition, suggestions were introduced in the first email with the following sentence: “If the 
average monetary donation (contribution) is €20 <€10>, we need 100 <200> participants in the 
campaign to cover the expected costs.” The same sentence was repeated in the final reminder. This 
formulation mirrors the variations in Adena, Huck, and Rasul (2014).  
On top, we implemented some additional incentives that were equal for all versions of emails and 
aimed at making participation in the campaign more attractive. First, we offered various nested 
rewards by levels of gifts with thresholds at: €5, €10, €20, €30, and €100. The rewards included 
vouchers for participation in tournaments and games, and a rare book for the highest gifts. A buffet 
pledge was valued at €10 and added to the monetary gift when determining the reward. Second, 
we offered fixed matching of €5 by an anonymous sponsor for early gifts that was not counted 
towards the reward. In addition, it was announced that any surplus money would be donated to a 
refugee project (see Appendix C for details of the mailing). In addition to the first email, three 
reminders were sent. The emails were sent in English5 since a large proportion of staff is 
international and has no or hardly any command of German. 
In the “donation” treatment, the word “donation” appeared 19 times in the first email, once in the 
first (short) reminder, twice in the second reminder, and four times in the third reminder, whereas 
the word “contribution” was never used. Each time the email was sent, all the previous email 
communications were appended such that with the third reminder the total word count of 
“donation” was 26. The “contribution” treatment involved the same number of uses of the word 
“contribution” and no use of the word “donation”. 
We implemented blocked randomization. The available individual characteristics were based on 
membership in email lists such as “female,” “postdocs”, “PhD students”, different departments, or 
different administration mailing lists etc. Some of the characteristics were corrected by hand. All 
variables used for the randomization and mean comparisons between different treatments can be 
                                                          
5 Only the first email included a translation in German at the bottom. 
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seen in Table A2 in the Appendix A. The given sample size allows us to detect a standardized 
effect size of 0.24 with alpha equal to 0.05 and power equal to 0.8.  
By choosing personalized emails, we aimed at reducing spillovers between treatments. We cannot 
rule out that recipients talked about the party with each other. But since the differences between 
the emails were rather subtle, they should probably have gone unnoticed and nobody mentioned to 
us that they had become aware of the variation. If there was some awareness about treatment 
differences, for which we do not have any evidence, our results would constitute the lower bound 
of the true treatment effects.6 
The total money collected was updated daily on the institute’s intranet and communicated via 
reminders over the course of the campaign. 
 
3 Results 
The campaign achieved a total of 127 gifts7 (either monetary, buffet or both) which is close to the 
expected participation of around 150-200 (including some family members). Relative to the 
number of emails sent, the response rate was 23%. The average monetary gift was €12 and the 
median €10. Figure A1 in the Appendix presents the number of gifts by day, and suggests the 
importance of reminders, since most gifts came in shortly after the reminders were sent out. Most 
gifts were exactly equal to the amounts specified in the reward scheme (€5, €10, €20, €30, €100) 
but there were also a few other amounts. There were eight donations larger than €20 including two 
€100 donations. Overall, the campaign was successful in collecting enough money to cover the 
costs, and it surpassed the announced monetary threshold of €2000 if everything is counted in. The 
final sum of €2241 comprises €1506 in monetary gifts, 34 buffet pledges valued at €340, and a 
€395 bonus from the matching scheme. After all costs were covered, the surplus of €275 was 
donated to a refugee program in line with the announcement in the emails.  
 
                                                          
6 Of course, some indirect spillovers can also be at play: social influence if one person announces to colleagues that 
she gave a particular amount, the colleagues might follow. We cannot completely exclude this. However, what we can 
show is that there is no special clustering over time by the group to which one belongs, see Figure A2 in the Appendix.  
7 Gifts from people involved in the design of the experiment are excluded from the analysis. 
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The effect of the “donation” and “contribution” frames 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results from the framing treatments. The use of the word “donation” 
rather than “contribution” resulted in a slightly higher response rate (a 14% non-significant 
increase) and much higher average positive monetary gifts (an increase of 48%, borderline 
significant at p<0.1), and a much higher overall monetary return (an increase of 69%, significant 
at p<0.05). The effects are very similar once the buffet pledges are counted in. Higher gift levels 
and revenue in the “donation” frame are in line with Hypothesis 1. 
Table 1: Results of different wording 
Treatment “Contribution” “Donation” T-test p-value  Test of proportions 
p-value 
Number of subjects 273 
 
272 
   
Number of monetary gifts 56 
 
64 
   
Share monetary gift 0.220 (0.025) 0.246 (0.026)  0.4728 
Monetary return per mail in € 1.963 (0.279) 3.327 (0.634) 0.049 
 
Average positive monetary gift 
in € 
9.571 (0.744) 14.141 (2.218) 0.067 
 
Minimum in € 5 
 
5 
   
Median in € 10 
 
10 
   
Maximum in € 30 
 
100 
   
Number buffet 16 
 
18 
   
Share buffet 0.059 (0.014) 0.066 (0.015) 
 
0.7357 
Total number of gifts 61 
 
69 
   
Overall response rate 0.223 (0.025) 0.254 (0.026) 
 
0.3958 
Return per mail including 
monetized buffet in € 
2.549 (0.345) 3.989 (0.659) 0.053 
 
Average positive gift including 
monetized buffet in € 
11.410 (0.858) 15.725 (2.026) 0.063 
 
Share gifts €5-6 conditional on 
giving 
0.429 (0 .066) 0. .406 (0 .061)  0.805 
Share gifts €10 conditional on 
giving 
0.411 (0.066) 0.297 (0.057)  0.192 
Share gifts €15 and more 
conditional on giving 
0.161 (0.049) 0.297 (0 .057)  0.079 
Notes: standard error in parenthesis; two sided tests. 
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Table 2: Distribution of gift values including buffet monetized at €10 
 
0 5 6 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 50 100 Total 
“Contribution” 212 19 1 22(5) 5(4) 13(6) 0 0 0 1(1) 0 0 273 
“Donation” 203 19 0 18(5) 12(7) 13(6) 1 2 1 0 1 2 272 
Total 415 38 1 40 17 26 1 2 1 1 1 2 545 
Notes: Gift thresholds that result in a reward are underscored, number of gifts that includes buffet 
in brackets.  
 
Table 2 shows the numbers gifts of different values (monetary gift plus buffet valued at €10) in the 
two frames. First, there are more gifts in higher categories in the “donation” frame. There are seven 
gifts of value €25 or more in the “donation” frame compared to only one in the “contribution” 
frame and there are 32 gifts of value €15 or more in the “donation” frame compared to 19 in the 
“contribution” frame. The share of gifts of value €15 or more is significantly higher in the 
“donation” frame, see bottom rows in Table 1. 
 
Second, there are more gifts in the “donation” frame that do not correspond to a threshold value 
for a reward. More specifically, there are fifteen such gifts in in the “donation” frame while there 
are only seven in the “contribution” frame. Glazer and Konrad (1996) present evidence about 
bunching donations at the bottom of different published categories. For example, they report that 
68 percent of contributions made in the range $1,000- $4,999 at Carnegie Mellon University were 
exactly $1,000. While 68% might appear large, the reverse side is that 32% chose to give more 
than required to be listed as donors of a particular category. In a similar vein, Birke (2020) 
documents in an M-Turk experiment that a substantial fraction of subjects performs more voluntary 
tasks for a charity than necessary for a performance bonus. Moreover, more subjects perform two 
and more tasks above the bonus level if their behavior is observed by others. He explains that 
subjects signal their prosociality by separating from bonus-motivated types. As in our case the 
amount above the reward level is not observed by others, we think that the choice of higher levels 
is linked to self-signaling and that the difference between the “donation” and “contribution” frame 
is due to the voluntary component of a “donation” frame which is weakened in the “contribution” 
frame. If a “contribution” is perceived as an obligation, then there is no point in signaling 
prosociality. Altogether, we confirm Hypothesis 2. 
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Next, we look at the distance between the gift value and the suggested amount in more detail.8 
Table 3 shows that the distance to the suggested amount is almost 40% larger in the “donation” 
frame. There is also more variance in the gift amounts in general in the “donation” than in the 
“contribution” frame (columns III and VI, significant difference according to the variance-
comparison test). These results are in line with our Hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 3: Distance to suggested amounts and variance 
 Not accounting for buffet gifts Accounting for buffet gifts 
Treatment Number 
of 
subjects 
Distance to 
the 
suggested 
amount 
Standard 
deviations 
from the 
mean 
Number of 
subjects 
Distance 
to the 
suggested 
amount 
Standard 
deviations 
from the 
mean 
 I II III IV V VI 
“Contribution” 56 7.393 9.571 61 6.787 11.410 
  (0. 683) (0.744)  (0.737) (0.858) 
“Donation” 64 10.234 14.140 69 9.493 15.725 
  (1.858) (2.218)  (1.734) (2.026) 
One-sided t-test p-value  0.086   0.086  
Variance-comparison test 
p-value 
  0.000   0.000 
Variance-comparison 
robust test p-value 
  0.004   0.037 
 
Finally, we comment on the behavior concerning the bonus, see also Table A3 in the Appendix. A 
bonus of €5 was offered by an anonymous donor for all gifts before a pre-specified deadline. Note 
that although the bonus increases the gift received, it was not counted against the reward. Therefore, 
individuals who want to increase the total amount collected should choose to give early while those 
who are only interested in rewards might equally give later. We also expect the gifts with bonus to 
                                                          
8 The direct effects of suggestions are summarized in Appendix A. We find evidence in favor of higher non-binding 
suggestions similar to those observed in Adena, Huck, and Rasul (2014). Higher suggestion of €20, relative to the 
suggestion of €10, changed the distribution of gifts generating more €10 gifts and fewer €5 gifts, changing both the 
median and the mode, and increased the overall return, although not significantly. The results differ from experiments 
on gift grids in Adena and Huck (2020) and Reiley and Samek (2015) who found detrimental effects of higher grids. 
A potential explanation for these differences may be that suggestions are softer than grids and that higher gifts also go 
hand in hand with greater rewards in a typical crowdfunding campaign. Figure A4 in the Appendix shows the exact 
distribution relative to the suggested amounts. 
 
10 
 
be lower following the literature about the crowding-out effect of third party transfers on charitable 
giving (see, for example, Adena and Huck 2017; Huck and Rasul 2011; Huck, Rasul, and Shephard 
2015). While the number of late gifts without the bonus was equal in both frames, there were 43 
early gifts in the “donation” frame compared to 36 in the “contribution” frame.9 The level of 
monetary gifts was in both frames lower with the bonus. Overall, it looks like the bonus was more 
successful at stipulating additional gifts in the “donation” frame. 
 
An additional experiment on M-Turk measuring emotional responses 
In order to parse out the mechanism behind the differences in behavior in our two different frames, 
we conducted an additional survey experiment using the M-Turk platform.10 Subjects were put into 
an artefactual situation in which they were asked, depending on the treatment, to “donate” or to 
“contribute” to a public good and subsequently we measured their feelings using a Geneva 
Emotional Wheel (GEW).11 The GEW summarizes 20 different emotions which are organized on 
a circle. The two main dimensions of the circle reflect the extent to which emotions are aligned 
with feelings of being in control (on the vertical axis) and the positivity or negativity of emotions 
(on the horizontal axis). 
The results of our M-Turk study are presented in condensed form in Figure 1, Table 4 and 5, and 
in more details in Table A5 in the Appendix. In Figure 1, that shows the Geneva Emotional Wheel, 
all emotion variables are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one. We 
chose this exposition because of stark differences on the scale between different emotions. The 
dashed line presents the deviation of the mean in the “donation” treatment from the overall mean 
(in terms of standard deviations). The solid line presents the deviation of the mean in the 
“contribution” treatment from the overall mean. The two main dimensions of the GEW are 
presented in boxes.   
                                                          
9 We do not count one gift in the “donation” frame since the person asked on the last bonus day for money transfer 
details but the transfer itself occurred only later. 
10 We selected US subjects for participation. 
11 Version 3.0, http://www.affective-sciences.org/en/gew/, viewed on 16.02.2020 based on (Scherer 2005; Scherer et 
al. 2013; Sacharin, Schlegel, and Scherer 2012) 
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It is easy to see that the “contribution” frame is associated with more negative feelings than the 
“donation” frame. Throughout the entire left half of the cycle the two frames are roughly two 
standard deviations apart. In terms of positive emotions, the two frames generate much more 
similar responses but donations are associated with stronger feelings of “love” and “compassion”.  
These results appear to be in line with what word maps and Google Trends suggested so far: as the 
term “contribution” implies much less voluntary sentiment and is more reflective of an obligation 
it also evokes more negative emotional responses. 
Figure 1: “Donations” vs. “contributions” on the Geneva Emotional Wheel  
 
In a second step, we present correlations between the individually chosen gift levels to the public 
good and the emotion level stated afterwards (see Table 4 and 5). We find that the correlation is 
very strong for 18 out of 20 emotions and that positive emotions correlate positively with gift level 
and negative emotions negatively. Although the average gift levels did not differ between the two 
frames in our M-Turk experiment (perhaps because of the much more artificial nature of the 
situation) our results indicate that there are strong differences in emotions between frames and that 
emotions are strong correlates of gift levels. 
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Table 4: Positive emotions and gift level  
           
Interest 18.540***          
 (2.180)          
Amusement  11.165***         
  (2.214)         
Pride   22.016***        
   (2.125)        
Joy    17.508***       
    (2.182)       
Pleasure     19.869***      
     (2.123)      
Contentment      13.612***     
      (2.257)     
Love       14.968***    
       (2.107)    
Admiration        14.166***   
        (2.116)   
Relief         3.280  
         (2.177)  
Compassion          22.760*** 
          (2.121) 
Constant 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 
 (2.103) (2.155) (2.068) (2.112) (2.090) (2.140) (2.131) (2.137) (2.182) (2.060) 
Observations 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 
R2 0.073 0.027 0.103 0.065 0.084 0.039 0.048 0.043 0.002 0.110 
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.026 0.102 0.064 0.083 0.038 0.047 0.042 0.001 0.109 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 5: Negative emotions and gift level  
           
Sadness -7.644***          
 (2.248)          
Guilt  -16.269***         
  (2.311)         
Regret   -10.456***        
   (2.102)        
Shame    -15.752***       
    (2.327)       
Disappointment     -10.607***      
     (2.141)      
Fear      -1.873     
      (2.125)     
Disgust       -7.677***    
       (2.221)    
Contempt        -6.194***   
        (2.350)   
Hate         -5.899***  
         (2.193)  
Anger          -6.722*** 
          (2.119) 
Constant 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 110.243*** 
 (2.170) (2.122) (2.158) (2.126) (2.158) (2.183) (2.170) (2.175) (2.176) (2.173) 
Observations 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 985 
R2 0.012 0.056 0.023 0.053 0.024 0.001 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.010 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.055 0.022 0.052 0.023 -0.000 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.009 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented results from a field experiment on crowdfunding for a club good. We 
varied the message within the crowdfunding campaign in order to explore the role of “donation” 
and “contribution” frames. We found that a “donation” frame attracted more and higher donations 
than a “contribution” frame. We documented that the word “donation” is connotated with a 
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voluntary action and might, hence, be more effective in generating warm glow for a donor and 
stimulating positive self-image. In contrast, a “contribution” appears to be perceived more as an 
obligation. In an additional experiment run on M-Turk we find support for this interpretation. The 
word “contribution” generates relatively more negative emotions than the word “donation”. 
We also document some interaction patterns between the framing and other features of the 
crowdfunding campaign, notably the strong attraction of gift levels that are associated with 
rewards, which is also in line with our interpretation. As such our paper also adds to the nascent 
literature on crowdfunding. A general overview on the economics of the crowdfunding market is 
provided in Agrawal et al. (2014) while Strausz (2017) provides a formal model. Most of the 
existing studies on crowdfunding make use of observational data (e.g. Meer 2014, Argo et al. 
2020). While those are usually based on extremely rich data, the question of whether the observed 
correlations can be interpreted as causal is not always obvious. The number of experiments on 
crowdfunding is still small. Cason and Zubrickas (2017, 2019) and Cason, Tabarrok, and Zubrickas 
(2019) conduct laboratory experiments in which they test different incentive schemes like bonuses 
for early contributions. Similarly, in a web based experiment, Ansink et al. (2017) test the effects 
of seed money and the impact of the attraction effect. In a field experiment, Burtch et al. (2015) 
study the effects of privacy. Our experiment adds a new perspective to the above literature. 
While our field experiment explores a crowdfunding setting, that is, a mechanism that raises money 
for a club good and offers different reward levels, the fundamental explanation for our treatment 
effects— different frames trigger different emotions—should apply also to other setting where acts 
can be framed as donations or contributions.   
Our findings also speak to the still surprisingly small literature on emotions and economic decision 
making, pioneered in Kirchsteiger, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2006) who explore the role of "mood" 
for gift-exchange games. More closely related to our study is Konow (2010) who explores reported 
feelings after dictator game / donation decisions and shows how emotional responses depend on 
the identity of the receiver. Given the surprisingly large effect of our small variation we conjecture 
that there is still a lot of low-hanging fruit to be harvested in this area of research. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Differences between crowdfunding, public goods, fundraising, and this experiment. 
 Public goods Fundraising Crowdfunding This experiment 
Beneficiaries  Everybody Other people 
(everybody for 
certain charitable 
goals) 
Contributors (other 
people in donation-
based form) 
Contributors 
(everybody at the 
institute) 
Goods or services in 
return for payment 
- (-) 
Can include lottery 
or small gifts 
(+) 
Rewards possible 
(+) 
Rewards included 
Threshold (-) can be spelled 
out 
(-) can be spelled 
out 
(+) usually provided 
but not always binding 
(for example 
JustGiving, 
betterplace.org ) 
(+) implicitly 
spelled out. Not 
binding but 
effectively affects 
the amount of 
public good. 
Amounts collected 
so far 
(-) can be spelled 
out 
(-) can be spelled 
out 
+ usually provided + provided in 
reminder emails 
and on the intranet 
Figure A1: Number of contributions by day and reminders 
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Figure A2: Clustering over time 
  
The above figure shows the numbers of gifts by day and group to which a person belongs to at the 
institute (alumni and friends are not included, some doubling is possible as, for example, secretaries 
belong both to the administration and departments). We do not correct for the size of the group.  
While some groups cluster more around some days, it does not seem to be a general pattern and 
might happen at random.  
  
0
5
10
15
20
14 15 16 20 21 22 23 27 28 29 30
18 
 
 
Randomization 
Table A2: Individual characteristics in each of the 2 x 2 randomization cells and t-test p-values 
 “Donation” “Contribution” t-test p-values 
 10€ 20€ 10€ 20€ 
 1 2 3 4 1=2 1=3 2=3 4=2 4=3 1=4 
 
mean se mean se mean se mean se t-test p-value 
Females 0,504 0,043 0,511 0,043 0,504 0,043 0,511 0,043 0,905 0,999 0,904 0,953 0,951 0,952 
Professor  0,044 0,018 0,051 0,019 0,051 0,019 0,051 0,019 0,798 0,798 1,000 0,798 0,798 1,000 
Postdoc  0,141 0,030 0,139 0,030 0,146 0,030 0,139 0,030 0,961 0,902 0,863 0,898 0,764 0,860 
PhD student 0,207 0,035 0,182 0,033 0,190 0,034 0,182 0,033 0,606 0,717 0,877 0,832 0,953 0,762 
RA 0,141 0,030 0,153 0,031 0,161 0,031 0,153 0,031 0,771 0,649 0,869 0,906 0,778 0,863 
Faculty I 0,185 0,034 0,204 0,035 0,212 0,035 0,204 0,035 0,691 0,585 0,882 0,951 0,931 0,647 
Faculty II 0,081 0,024 0,102 0,026 0,095 0,025 0,102 0,026 0,556 0,698 0,840 0,710 0,865 0,828 
Faculty III 0,126 0,029 0,117 0,028 0,117 0,028 0,117 0,028 0,818 0,818 1,000 0,450 0,450 0,328 
Faculty IV 0,074 0,023 0,044 0,018 0,051 0,019 0,044 0,018 0,291 0,436 0,777 0,979 0,798 0,304 
Faculty V 0,096 0,025 0,124 0,028 0,124 0,028 0,124 0,028 0,466 0,466 1,000 0,964 0,964 0,440 
Administration  0,081 0,024 0,080 0,023 0,058 0,020 0,080 0,023 0,971 0,458 0,477 0,971 0,458 1,000 
IT 0,007 0,007 0,015 0,010 0,015 0,010 0,015 0,010 0,571 0,571 1,000 0,571 0,571 1,000 
Library  0,030 0,015 0,022 0,013 0,044 0,018 0,022 0,013 0,689 0,536 0,311 0,689 0,536 1,000 
Press  0,022 0,013 0,022 0,013 0,015 0,010 0,022 0,013 0,986 0,642 0,653 0,986 0,642 1,000 
Secretaries  0,059 0,020 0,073 0,022 0,066 0,021 0,073 0,022 0,650 0,827 0,813 0,650 0,827 1,000 
 
Table A3: Early and late gifts 
 Early gifts with match offer of €5 Early gifts without match offer 
Treatment Total 
number of 
gifts 
Buffet 
gifts 
Number of 
monetary 
gifts 
Average 
positive 
monetary 
gift 
Average 
positive 
gift 
including 
buffet 
monetized 
Total 
number of 
gifts 
Buffet 
gifts 
Number of 
monetary 
gifts 
Average 
positive 
monetary 
gift 
Average 
positive 
gift 
including 
buffet 
monetized 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
“Contribution” 36 12 33 8.33 
(0.891) 
11.67 
(0.976) 
25 4 22 9.44 
(1.359) 
11.04 
(1.575) 
           
“Donation” 43 13 40 12.44 
(2.531) 
15.47 
(2.439) 
25 5 22 14.4 
(3.898) 
16.4 
(3.759) 
 
  
19 
 
Figure A3: The associations with the words “contribution” and “donation” (source: 
http://www.snappywords.com/) 
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Table A4: Google Trends searches (worldwide, 01.01.04 – 15.12.17) 
Donation: Relative frequency Contribution Relative frequency 
blood 100 ira 100 
blood donation 95 ira contribution 100 
organ donation 45 401k contribution 75 
plasma donation 40 401k 75 
plasma 35 what is contribution 55 
donate 35 roth contribution 50 
goodwill 25 ira contribution limits 50 
donation center 25 roth ira 40 
goodwill donation 25 roth ira contribution 40 
egg donation 20 contribution margin 35 
donation letter 20 sss 35 
sperm donation 20 sss contribution 30 
salvation army donation 20 hsa contribution 25 
salvation army 20 hsa 25 
donation request 20 401k limits 25 
charity donation 20 401k contribution limits 25 
red cross donation 20 roth contribution limits 25 
donation pick up 20 cpf 25 
red cross 15 cpf contribution 20 
car donation 15 roth ira contribution limits 20 
hair donation 15 defined contribution 20 
clothing donation 15 maximum 401k contribution 20 
furniture donation 15 lotto contribution 20 
red cross blood donation 10 lotto world contribution 15 
clothes donation 10 contribution definition 15 
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Table A5: M-Turk survey and emotion levels by frame 
 “Donation” “Contribution”  
 mean std. err. mean std. err. 
t-test p-
value 
Interest 63.015 1.274 67.456 1.186 0.011 
Amusement 35.565 1.479 41.941 1.425 0.002 
Pride 46.219 1.587 47.840 1.463 0.453 
Joy 48.276 1.504 47.182 1.412 0.596 
Pleasure 50.173 1.463 51.002 1.376 0.680 
Contentment 53.479 1.504 55.996 1.352 0.214 
Love 37.928 1.550 34.082 1.452 0.070 
Admiration 33.850 1.490 34.070 1.394 0.914 
Relief 28.992 1.372 33.098 1.323 0.031 
Compassion 49.105 1.573 42.965 1.457 0.004 
Sadness 7.274 0.704 9.634 0.764 0.023 
Guilt 9.439 0.804 12.260 0.882 0.018 
Regret 9.338 0.708 12.759 0.884 0.003 
Shame 7.968 0.738 10.630 0.850 0.018 
Disappointment 7.561 0.655 10.487 0.822 0.005 
Fear 8.063 0.700 11.992 0.845 0.000 
Disgust 5.589 0.555 8.667 0.773 0.001 
Contempt 12.447 1.064 15.415 1.089 0.052 
Hate 5.361 0.534 7.159 0.683 0.038 
Anger 5.411 0.545 7.675 0.700 0.011 
 
 
Suggestions of €10 and €20 
Table A6 presents the results by different suggestion levels. While the response rate was almost 
identical in both treatments, the average positive monetary gift increased by €1.75 or 16% when 
the higher amount was suggested (not significant). The median increased from €5 in the €10-
suggestion treatment to €10 in the €20-suggestion treatment. Since the shares of individuals that 
contributed to the buffet were similar between treatments, we do not see any substitution between 
monetary and non-monetary donations. Figure A4 presents the distribution of different gift 
categories by the suggested level (€10 and €20) and frame. There is a visible shift in the distribution 
towards larger amounts with higher suggestions. Moreover, the mode increases from €5 with lower 
suggestions to €10 with higher suggestions. Table A6 confirms the impression from Figure A4. 
The giving frequency of €5 is higher with lower suggestions and this difference is statistically 
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significant. The giving frequencies of €10 as well as €15 and over are higher with higher 
suggestions, with only the first difference being statistically significant. Although the overall 
monetary return is higher with higher suggestions, it is so only by 12% and this difference is not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table A6: Results of suggestions 
Treatment € 10 € 20 T-test p-
value  
Test of 
proportions 
Number of subjects 272 
 
273 
   
Number of monetary gifts 61 
 
59 
   
Monetary return per subject 2.5 (0.472) 2.788 (0.508) 0.679 
 
Return per subject including buffet monetized at 
€10 
3.162 (0 .515) 3.374 (0 .539) 0.776  
Average positive gift 11.148 (1.699) 12.898 (1.833) 0.485 
 
Average positive gift including buffet 
monetized 
13.030 (1.605) 14.391 (1.686) 0.560  
Minimum   5 
 
5 
   
Median 5 
 
10 
   
Maximum 100 
 
100 
   
Share monetary gift 0.235 (0.026) 0.231 (0.026) 
 
0.9562 
Share buffet 0.066 (0.015) 0.059 (0.014) 
 
0.7357 
Overall response rate 0.243 (0.026) 0.234 (0.026) 
 
0.8053 
Share gifts €5-6 conditional on giving 0.508 (0.065) 0.305 (0.060) 
 
0.0386  
Share gifts €10 conditional on giving 0.279 (0.058) 0.424 (0.065) 
 
0.0958 
Share gifts €15 and more conditional on giving 0.213 (0.053) 0.254 (0.057) 
 
0.5944  
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
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Figure A4: Frequency of different gift values by “donation”/“contribution” frame and different 
suggestions.  
 
Note: buffet is monetized at €10 
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Appendix B: Additional results 
Individual characteristics 
In this section, we explore the available information on personal characteristics. However, one 
must be cautious with the interpretation, since the individual characteristics are likely related to the 
actual attendance of the summer party and this, in turn, with the participation in the crowdfunding 
campaign.  
In Table B1, we present the results from simple regressions including individual characteristic 
dummies. Column I looks at the monetary return per email by presenting the results from an OLS 
regression with monetary gifts (including zeros) as the dependent variable. Column II shows the 
effect of individual characteristics on positive gifts only (OLS regression). Column III analyses the 
response rate by presenting the marginal effects from a Probit regression. When looking at the 
dummies professor, postdoc, PhD student, student RA, and administrative staff, note that the 
reference group is the remainder including current guests, alumni or affiliated researchers not on 
the institute’s payroll. First, we see that the response rate of postdocs, PhD students, and 
administrative staff is significantly higher. In terms of positive gifts, those given by professors 
clearly stand out (an increase by €30). The combined result—the return—is significantly higher of 
professors and administrative staff. 
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Table B1: Individual characteristics 
 Monetary return Average 
positive gift 
Overall 
response rate 
 OLS OLS Probit m.e. 
“Donation” 1.402** 4.265* 0.030 
 (0.680) (2.273) (0.036) 
    
€20 suggestion 0.189 1.604 -0.013 
 (0.680) (2.258) (0.036) 
    
 
Female 
0.229 -2.576 0.039 
 (0.701) (2.337) (0.037) 
    
Professor 6.394*** 30.731*** 0.023 
 (1.664) (5.890) (0.090) 
    
Postdoc 1.327 -2.405 0.148*** 
 (1.107) (3.498) (0.055) 
    
PhD student 0.528 -3.239 0.114** 
 (0.989) (3.151) (0.051) 
    
Student RA -1.424 -5.887 -0.092 
 (1.070) (4.984) (0.064) 
    
Administrative staff 1.815* 1.111 0.154*** 
 (0.968) (2.926) (0.048) 
    
Constant 0.929 10.293***  
 (0.851) (3.140)  
Observations 544 119 544 
R2/ Pseudo R2 0.050 0.280 0.044 
Standard errors in parentheses; not accounting for buffet contributions (results are similar) 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Next, we present separate and more detailed comparisons between the group of academics and the 
administrative staff, subgroups of the academics only, and between male and female email 
recipients that confirm the above results. We also test for heterogeneous treatment effects and find 
that females respond more often when the “donation” framing is used and that the administrative 
staff members are less responsive to higher suggestions.12 
                                                          
12 We chose gender and administrative status for the heterogeneity analysis since this divides the sample in relatively 
large groups. Gender differences in positive versus negative frames in public good games have been studied by 
Fujimoto and Park (2010). They found that gift levels are similar for both genders in the positive frame while male 
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Figure B1 shows the average return in both frames by academic status. This status also corresponds 
to large income (also age) differences. While in the “contribution” frame, the gifts seem not to be 
strongly related to status/income, they are in the “donation” frame.13  
Figure B1: Monetary gifts by status 
 
                                                          
subjects give significantly lower amounts in the negative frame. With our interpretation of the “donation” frame 
being more positive, our results differ from Fujimoto and Park (2010). The results in Table B4 suggest that female 
participants gave significantly more often than males in the “donation” frame. This might, however, be driven by 
more females working in administration and thus having lower income but also with a higher participation of the 
administrative staff, which seems in line with results in Table B5. 
13 Note that there might not be that large difference in income between postdocs and doctoral students. They usually 
are remunerated according to the same pay scale but doctoral students often have a 2/3 contract. 
0
5
10
15
Student RA PhD student PostDoc Professor
Average monetary contribution
0
5
10
15
Student RA PhD student PostDoc Professor
Average monetary donation
Notes: including zeros
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Table B2: Academics versus administration 
Group Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
monetary 
gifts 
Overall 
return per 
mail 
Average 
positive 
gift 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Share 
monetary 
gift 
share 
buffet 
Overall 
response 
rate 
Academics 325 64 2.354 11.953 5 0.200 0.046 0.203 
   (0.429) (1.731) 10 
100 
(0.022) (0.012) (0.022) 
Administration 118 36 3.686 12.083 5 0.331 0.085 0.339 
   (.958) (2.675) 10 
100 
(0.033) (0.026) (0.044) 
T-test p-value    0.147 0.966     
Test of proportions      0.004 0.120 0.003 
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
 
Table B3: Gender 
Group Number 
of 
subjects 
Number 
of 
monetary 
gifts 
Overall 
return per 
mail 
Average 
positive 
gift 
Minimum 
Median 
Maximum 
Share 
monetary 
gift 
share 
buffet 
Overall 
response 
rate 
Male 269 54 2.494 12.426 5 0.204 0.048 0.212 
   (0.485) (1.899) 10 
100 
(0.025) (0.013) (0.025) 
Female 276 66 2.790 11.667 5 0.261   0.076 0.264 
   (0.496) (1.660) 10 
100 
(0.026) (0.016) (0.027) 
T-test p-value    0.670 0.763    0.150 
Test of proportions      0.119 0.180 0.150 
Note: standard error in parenthesis  
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Heterogenous treatment effects 
Table B4: Interaction with gender 
 Monetary return Average 
positive gift 
Overall 
response rate 
 OLS OLS Probit m.e. 
“Donation” 0.683 6.283* -0.053 
 (0.985) (3.725) (0.053) 
    
€20 suggestion -0.720 -2.252 -0.037 
 (0.985) (3.712) (0.053) 
    
Female -1.362 -3.586 -0.053 
 (1.197) (4.313) (0.063) 
    
Female*“donation” 1.337 -2.698 0.155** 
 (1.384) (5.057) (0.072) 
    
Female*€20 
suggestion 
1.969 6.918 0.053 
 (1.384) (4.996) (0.073) 
    
Constant 2.513*** 10.676***  
 (0.850) (2.954)  
Observations 545 120 545 
R2 /Pseudo R2 0.013 0.052 0.013 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table B5: Interaction with administrative staff 
 Monetary 
return 
Average 
positive gift 
Overall 
response rate 
 OLS OLS Probit m.e. 
“Donation” 1.256 4.830 0.017 
 (0.776) (3.000) (0.042) 
    
€20 suggestion 1.074 3.630 0.011 
 (0.776) (3.000) (0.042) 
    
Administrative 
staff 
3.086** 3.576 0.137* 
 (1.461) (4.574) (0.072) 
    
Administrative 
staff *“donation” 
0.787 0.047 0.062 
 (1.666) (5.508) (0.084) 
    
Administrative 
staff*€20 
suggestion 
-4.116** -7.735 -0.099 
 (1.668) (5.583) (0.083) 
    
Constant 1.160* 7.395***  
 (0.667) (2.671)  
Observations 544 119 544 
R2 0.024 0.049  
Pseudo R2   0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
We don’t know the exact participation at the party but it seemed to be as usual. Below, we present 
the number of people who donated, were eligible to take part in games and the number of 
individuals who actually took part in the games. 
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Table B6: Participation at the party 
Donated €5 
or more   
Donated at 
least €10 or 
buffet/  
Donated at 
least €20 or 
buffet+€10/ 
    
Eligible for 
participation 
in games or 
more 
Eligible for 
only 1 
experiment 
Eligible for 
2 
experiments 
Maximum 
possible 
participation 
in 
experiments 
Actual 
participation 
in 
Experiment 1 
Actual 
participation 
in 
experiment 2 
sum 
130* 57 34 125 49 28 77 
Notes: * includes gifts from originators of the experiment 
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Appendix C 
First email (Different versions are marked with curly and angle brackets) 
Dear XXX-ers and friends, 
 
This year our XXX summer party follows the motto 
  
There is such a thing like a free lunch. 
 
The party will take place on Tuesday, the 5th of July, beginning at 4pm.  
And so this time we do not want to install a cash box on the day, however we do need your 
contributions {donations} to a crowdfunding campaign now. Below you will find more 
information. 
 
The XXX group is planning a party with: 
 
[Food & Drinks]: We are planning a BBQ with organic sausages that come from appropriately 
treated animals as well as the usual assortment of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages. In 
addition, there will be the well renowned XXX potluck buffet of salads and cakes. 
 
[Special Entertainment]: We are planning several (team) games and hands-on experiments, 
music, as well as a small campfire. Childcare and fun activities for children will be organized as 
usual by the Family Service. 
As usual, please send the information regarding the number of children for whom you need child 
care, and their respective ages to: yyy@yy.yy by June 24, 2016. 
 
In order to ensure that it will be a wonderful party, we are now starting a 
 
>>>>>>>>>> Crowdfunding Campaign <<<<<<<<<<< 
 
Contribute {Donate} to our summer party, please! 
 
For our summer party, we need your support with the food and drinks. You can do this through 
in-kind or money contributions, or preferably both!  
So, please, prepare salads and bake cakes for the 5th of July, and please also open your wallet 
(now)! 
 
For each contribution {donation} there is a Thank You, staggered as follows: 
 
[from € 5]: 
o    1 pass for all games and competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
 
[from € 10 or 1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o    1 pass for all games and competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros or 
Participation at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
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[from € 20 or € 10 +1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o 1 pass for all games and game competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
o Participation at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning another 50 Euros 
 
[from € 30 or € 20 +1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o 1 pass for all games and game competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
o Participation at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning another 50 Euros 
o We will play 5 songs of your choice 
 
[over 100 € or 90 € + 1 buffet contribution {donation}]: 
o 1 pass for all games and game competitions (for example, Kicker, Kubb, Ping Pong) 
o Participation in a decision experiment with the possibility of winning 50 Euros 
o Participation at a “tasting station” with the possibility of winning another 50 Euros 
o We will play 5 songs of your choice 
o A copy of the book "Fleisch und Farbe" (unique limited edition book, comprising only 100 
individually numbered prints). 
 
 
For every contribution {donation} made before 22.06.2016, an anonymous sponsor will make a 
bonus contribution {donation} of € 5 on your behalf. (However, these 5 euros are not included 
in the calculation of your “Thank You” Coupon.) 
 
If the average monetary contribution {donation} is 20 € <10€>, 
we need 100<200> participants in the campaign 
to cover the expected costs.* 
 
The current status of contributions {donation} will be documented daily on the Intranet at XXX 
(right column, updated each afternoon at 5 o'clock, Friday at 3). 
 
Your generous monetary contributions {donation} (or willingness to contribute {donation} to the 
buffet) can be confidentially made to xxxx (room xxx, between 9am-12 and 1pm - 5pm). (Those 
who cannot make the contribution {donation} in person may contact xxxx [at: xxx.xxx@xxx.xx] 
for the account details in order to do an online bank transfer) ** 
 
[Your contribution {donation} does even more!]: Your contribution {donation} doesn’t only 
support the summer party as a public good. If we receive more contributions {donation} than 
required for financing the party, then the surplus will be used for an additional worthy project, 
e.g. to support the Women’s Bike Project, facilitated by the AG Refugees. 
 
We look forward to your active participation in the crowdfunding campaign and, also, to a great 
party, 
 
The XXX 
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* The revenues will also be used to cover various minor costs, such as the purchase of bread, 
rolls, paper plates and cutlery as well as the music organization. 
 
** We will not announce any individual contribution {donation} information and guarantee 
confidentiality. 
 
*************************************************************************** 
First reminder 
Dear XXX-ers and friends, 
 
Maybe you have overlooked our email last week starting a crowdfunding campaign for this 
year's summer party (see below). We really believe that a party is much nicer without cash 
boxes so we hope you will join the crowd and help fund the party.  
 
Remember that if you contribute {donate} this week until Wednesday it will generate a match 
from an anonymous benefactor of five additional euros. 
 
All best 
The XXParty Team 
 
P.S. Crowdfunding barometer can be seen at xxx ! Take a look! 
****************************************************************************** 
Second reminder 
Re: Last match day (XXX summer party 2016) 
 
Dear XXX-ers and friends, 
 
while our crowdfunding campaign for the summer party will continue until end of June, 
TODAY is the last day where every contribution {donation} that we get will be matched by an 
additional 5 € from an anonymous benefactor. 
 
Until yesterday we collected inspiring 495€ (+185€ Boni) + 16 buffet pledges. 
Many thanks to all contributors {donors} so far! 
However, we are far away from the threshold we aim at  
(Needless to say, it won’t even cover the drinks). 
Therefore, we need you to 
join the crowd now! 
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To clarify all open questions, let us explain the purpose and working of this campaign once more: 
Everything what was traditionally organized and more: food (including vegetarian burgers and 
organic sausages), drinks (alcoholic and non-alcoholic), as well as music WILL BE FREE on 
the day. In addition, there will be the well renowned WZB potluck buffet of salads and cakes 
(also FREE). 
 
The rewards offered within the crowdfunding campaign are made only possible by the additional 
efforts of our department, are by no means standard, and should serve as additional motivation 
for the participation in the crowdfunding campaign.  
 
Follow the progress of the campaign at www.xxx.xx 
 
All best 
The XX Party Team 
****************************************************************************** 
Third reminder 
Last call: summer party crowdfunding and program 
 
 
Dear XXX-ers and friends,  
 
 
Less than a week is left till our amazing XXX summer party 2016 which takes place on Tuesday, 
5th of July, starting at 4 p.m. Since we don’t have a huge external sponsor this year, we need to 
rely on your participation in the crowdfunding campaign to finance the party!  
 
 
Until yesterday we collected inspiring 980€ (+395€ Boni) + 25 buffet pledges.  
Many thanks to all contributors {donors} so far!  
However, we are still missing the threshold we aim at.  
Two days left for contributions {donations}!  
Therefore, we need you to  
join the crowd now!  
(contributions {donations} are collected till the end of June by XXX,  
Room xxx, 9-12 a.m. and 1-5 p.m.)  
 
Remember: If the average monetary contribution {donation} is 20 €<10€>,  
we need 100<200> participants in the campaign  
to cover the expected costs.  
 
 
Last call: please send the information regarding the number of children you would like to sign in 
for the XXX Kinderfest (organized by Familienservice child care animators), and their 
respective ages TODAY to: yyy.y@yyy.yy.  
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Preliminary program:  
From 4:00 p.m. Barbeque (including veggie and vegan options), drinks, and potluck 
buffet  
From 4:00 p.m. XXX Kinderfest fun activities for children. 
4:00-5:30 p.m. Tasting experiment (Provided you are eligible, you may participate at 
any time while open. It won't take long, and you have the chance of 
winning 50 Euros.) 
From 4:00 p.m. Tournaments (in order to take part in Kicker (Foosball) or Table 
Tennis (Ping Pong) tournament you must sign up (alone or in pairs) till 
Friday 2 July with ZZZ.zz@zzz.zz. You will be assigned the staring 
time. Kubb will be open for spontaneous teams.) 
5:00 p.m. Experiment 2 (Those who are eligible will get a separate Email with 
instructions. It is necessary to be on time since the experiment takes 
place simultaneously for all participants. You must also bring either 
your smart phone, tablet or laptop with an internet connection with you. 
There is a chance to win 40 or 10 Euros.) 
5:30 p.m. We play your songs 
6:00 p.m. The results and winners of the experiments will be announced 
6:30-8:00 p.m. We are pleased to announce that XXX and his band XXX (www.xxx.xx) 
will play at our party 
6:30 p.m. Long drinks stand will be opened 
   
Follow the progress of the crowdfunding campaign at www.xx.xx 
 
 
All best  
 
The XX Party Team 
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